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ABSTRACT 
Objectives: To examine how Transnational Tobacco Companies (TTCs) tried to penetrate 
the Bulgarian cigarette market and influence tobacco excise tax policy after the fall of 
communism and during Bulgaria’s accession to the EU. 
Design: Analysis of internal tobacco industry documents supplemented by analysis of press 
coverage, tobacco industry journals, market reports, and key informant interviews. 
Results: TTCs have been involved in cigarette smuggling to and through Bulgaria since at 
least 1975 and used smuggling as a market-entry strategy. National tobacco company 
Bulgartabac appears to have been involved in smuggling its own cigarettes from and 
reimporting them to Bulgaria. Since Bulgaria’s accession to the EU opened the market to the 
TTCs, TTCs have exaggerated the scale of the illicit trade to successfully convince politicians 
and public health experts that tax increases lead to cigarette smuggling. Yet, sources point to 
TTCs’ continued complicity in cigarette smuggling to and through Bulgaria between 2000 
and 2010. TTCs aimed to influence the Bulgarian tobacco excise tax regime, import duties 
and pricing mechanism, but appear to have been less successful than in other former 
communist countries in part due to the co-existence of a state-owned tobacco company. 
Undisclosed meetings between the tobacco industry and government ministers and officials 
are ongoing despite Bulgaria being a party to the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control 
(FCTC). 
Conclusion: The TTCs continued involvement in smuggling suggests that deals in 2004, 
2007 and 2010 which the European Commission has reached with TTCs to address cigarette 
smuggling are inadequate. The TTCs’ continued access to policymakers suggests that the 
FCTC is not being properly implemented. 
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BACKGROUND 
One of the most effective means of reducing tobacco consumption is through taxing tobacco 
products[1-4], which also raises government revenue[5, 6]. Tobacco taxation is also a key 
concern for transnational tobacco companies (TTCs) as different tax structures offer different 
opportunities and threats depending on the company’s brand portfolio and the market in 
question (Table 1).  
 
Table 1 Characteristics of different types of tobacco excise tax structures 
Excise 
structure 
Description Effects on companies by context 
Specific  Levied as a fixed value 
(per cigarette 
weight/pieces/pack/ca
rton) 
 Companies with expensive brands usually favour this 
structure, as it reduces the potential for price differences 
between expensive and cheaper cigarette brands (thereby 
favouring expensive cigarettes) 
 For the same reasons, companies with cheaper brands 
usually dislike this structure. 
Ad-
valorem 
 Levied as a percentage 
of retail price 
 Companies with cheaper brands usually favour this 
structure, as it can lead to a large price discrepancy 
between their cheap brands and other, more expensive 
brands. 
 Companies with expensive brands usually dislike this 
structure due to the price discrepancy discussed above.  
Mixed 
 
 Incorporates both 
specific and ad valorem 
components  
 Companies with mid-range or with a broad portfolio of 
brands (i.e. expensive and cheaper products) usually 
prefer a mixed structure. 
Tiered  Tobacco excise may 
also be tiered, with 
different tax levels 
applied to different 
categories of tobacco 
product (e.g. cigarettes 
may be categorised by 
length or source - 
whether locally 
produced or imported) 
 Companies that produce tobacco products that conform 
to the lower tax levels will usually favour a tiered 
structure that discriminates in favour of their products. 
 Vice versa, companies whose products fall into the higher 
tax tiers usually dislike this structure. 
Source: Table adapted with permission from Shirane et al[7] 
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Despite the importance of tobacco tax policy to public health there is only limited research 
outside North America exploring how TTCs attempt to influence policy in this area, with 
most research examining TTC influence on tax levels rather than structures[8]. Existing 
research on TTC influence on tobacco control policy in post-communist countries has 
focused on the former Soviet Union[9-16]. 
 
This paper examines what strategies TTCs used to enter the Bulgarian market and how they 
tried to influence Bulgarian tobacco tax policy. The analysis focuses on the period 1988 to 
2011, and covers the collapse of communism, attempts to privatise the state-owned tobacco 
monopoly, and Bulgaria’s accession to the European Union (EU) in 2007.  
 
METHODS 
The Legacy Tobacco Documents Library website (http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/) was used 
between June 2011 and October 2011 to search internal tobacco industry documents for 
words initiating with Bulgar* in their title and combinations of words such as ‘excise’, ‘tax’, 
‘ad valorem’, ‘strategy’. In total, 1620 documents were reviewed to establish relevance. 
Additional data from tobacco industry journals, newspapers, and market reports, were used to 
supplement the document analysis. Most industry documents found were from British 
American Tobacco (BAT) and Philip Morris International (PMI). This is partly due to the 
nature of the Library which only includes documents from companies subject to the litigation 
which led to document discovery, and also reflects that BAT and PMI were most active in 
penetrating the Bulgarian market.  
 
For triangulation purposes, four semi-structured interviews were conducted in Bulgarian by a 
bi-lingual native-speaker with key informants knowledgeable of tobacco industry and 
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taxation developments in Bulgaria. Finding tobacco control experts working in government 
proved very difficult. Two interviewees were former civil servants. A third interviewee still 
working in government did not provide any information cited in this report. A further four 
civil servants in different Ministries declined or failed to respond after initial contact. 
Representatives of the tobacco industry (BAT, PMI and Bulgartabac) failed to respond or 
refused to participate in the research. Interviews were carried out following approval by the 
Research Ethics Committee at the University of Bath’s Department for Health. 
 
RESULTS  
The Bulgarian tobacco industry was nationalized in 1951. Although the tobacco market 
gradually opened to foreign competition from 1989 onwards, successive governments made 
several failed attempts to privatize the industry since 1998[17], and the national tobacco 
company, Bulgartabac, remained state-owned until October 2011[18](Box 1). This is of 
particular interest for excise tax policy since state monopolies generally produce cheaper 
brands than TTCs and tend to protect their local brands via ad valorem taxation (Table 1).  
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Box 1 Privatisation history of Bulgarian national tobacco company Bulgartabac 
First Attempt: April 1998 – March 2001 
 Context: Privatisation Agency established. Stringent conditions applied to sale (no one 
party allowed to buy majority stake). IMF supported privatisation process, expressing 
confidence “that the company can be brought to the point of sale by end-1999”[19]. 
 Result: PMI, Gallaher and Reemtsma submitted letter of intent to bid, but in July 2000, 
the tender was terminated and new bids were invited. Privatisation procedure terminated 
for second time in March 2001 without selecting a buyer.  
Second Attempt: Spring 2002 – April 2003 
 Context: Newly elected coalition government eager to complete privatisation. On offer 
was an 80% stake in Bulgartabac Holding. Conditions of sale required that no 
Bulgartabac staff would be made redundant. 
 Result: Deutsche-Bank owned Tobacco Capital Partners made winning bid of 110 million 
euro. The Higher Administration Court rejected deal on basis of conflict of interest, as 
owners of Tobacco Capital Partners were solicitors who had participated in legal analysis 
of Bulgartabac. In April 2003 the government rejected deal considering it unfavourable.  
Third Attempt: June 2003 – February 2005 
 Context: Piecemeal sale of Bulgartabac announced, with 9 cigarette production 
companies and 12 processing subsidiaries on offer.  
 Result: BAT offered 200 million euro to buy three best performing cigarette factories, but 
following opposition from Turkish ethnic minority party (MRF) in coalition government, 
BAT withdrew its offer in February 2005. IMF said privatization delays “remained 
troubling”, and welcomed plans to privatise Bulgartabac Holding by 2004[20].  
Fourth Attempt: February 2005 – October 2011 
 Context: In light of falling Bulgartabac revenues, Bulgartabac sought to improve its 
market share before following privatisation round. In 2009, two less profitable plants 
were sold on Stock Exchange.  
 Result: BAT appeared interested, but withdrew from tender in April 2011. In October 
2011 Austria-registered BT Invest, the only remaining contender, bought a 79.83% stake 
in company for 100.1 million euro. One press report speculated that MRF was linked to 
the undisclosed buyer of Bulgartabac[18]. 
 
BAT and PMI documents indicate that these two companies have been interested in the 
Bulgarian market at least since 1975[21, 22], and have been at the forefront of TTC activity 
in Bulgaria since the collapse of the communist regime (1989). Reasons for their interest are 
outlined in Box 2. BAT appeared primarily interested in establishing local production in the 
1990s (Box 1)[17, 23-27], while PMI was, and remains, primarily interested in gaining 
market share via imports[28-30]. 
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Box 2 Why TTCs viewed Bulgaria as lucrative market 
 
Cigarette imports and the illicit tobacco trade 
Prior to market liberalisation, western consumer goods could only be purchased in shops 
selling Western products in exchange for hard currency. Foreign cigarettes, inaccessible to 
most locals, became highly desirable; something which the TTCs were keen to exploit[33]. 
PMI’s strategy in the early 1990s was to “lobby government officials directly [...] on the 
benefits of the hard currency outlets until such time as consumers may freely purchase the 
same goods on the domestic markets”[28]. Although cigarette imports were allowed in 
Bulgaria from 1989, the government used a variety of tariff and non-tariff barriers to protect 
local production of tobacco[34](see Table 3). Consequently, imports destined for duty-free 
sale were also used to facilitate cigarette smuggling into Bulgaria[35]. In 1996, the then 
Bulgarian deputy Finance Minister, Bisser Slavkov, expressed concern that cigarettes 
Reason 1: Exploiting existing production infrastructure 
 Low average salaries and high production of tobacco leaf and products[31] 
 Increased profits possible by reducing workforce employed in tobacco industry[31] 
 Possibility of reducing amount of tobacco in each cigarette via updated leaf treatment 
techniques, thus further improving productivity and profit margins[31] 
Reason 2: Expansion of existing tobacco export business 
 Exploiting Bulgaria’s geographical location and cigarette output which would enable 
“transit trade”[22, 32], including export opportunities into closed markets of USSR, 
Eastern Europe, as well as Turkey where major local tobacco company was government 
owned until 2008[22, 28, 31] 
 Bulgaria’s cigarette production portfolio was (in late 80s) good for Africa and Middle 
East, where market for low-price brands was growing[31] 
Reason 3: Expansion of existing brand portfolio 
 Prospect for joint-venture with Bugartabac to produce foreign brands in Bulgaria[31] 
 Bulgarian tobacco industry could be highly competitive in low-price segment[28] 
 Potential for developing premium products, and low nicotine cigarettes destined for 
export to USSR[31] 
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imported for duty free sale “simply disappear”, stating that of 2000 tons of imported 
cigarettes only 150 tons had customs declarations[36].  
 
Tobacco industry documents suggest that TTCs were involved in cigarette smuggling to and 
through Bulgaria at least since 1975[21, 22], and remained involved for decades[21, 22, 32, 
33, 37]. Documents refer to “transit” trade[22, 32], “general trade”[37], and “duty not paid” 
cigarettes[38] in Bulgaria; all known industry euphemisms for smuggling[39-41]. A PMI 
document from 1975 speaks of cigarette imports for both the duty-free and the domestic 
market, when imported cigarettes could only be legally sold via duty-free or hard currency 
shops[22]. This document mentions “transit” business from Bulgaria to Italy and Turkey[22], 
both of which were closed markets with state-owned tobacco monopolies at the time[42], and 
discusses company plans to “follow up closely development of transit in order to continue 
increasing [PMI] market share”[21]. A BAT document from 1992 reflecting on illicit trade in 
Bulgaria states that: 
“Due to the high duties on imported cigarettes and spirits there is nothing such as 
totally legal imports, most importers use the duty-free facade to import goods and get 
around paying full duties”[32]. 
In 1994, BAT estimated that 99% of all imported cigarettes (both BAT and other brands) 
were imported via “general trade”[37] and identified the “continuation of parallel trade” in 
Bulgaria as an opportunity for BAT, while the “enforcement of banderoles” (which indicates 
if tobacco excise duties have been paid) was listed as a potential threat to BAT’s 
business[37]. A more recent company plan for 2000-2002 states that “stricter governmental 
restrictions and comprehensive market and trade controls” were an obstacle for BAT’s 
business in Bulgaria[43].  
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In 2000, a civil action was filed by the European Community in New York against PMI and 
RJ Reynolds (by 2000 Japan Tobacco Inc. had acquired the non-US operations of RJ 
Reynolds to become Japan Tobacco International), accusing them of involvement in tobacco 
smuggling[44, 45]. Legal settlements were reached with PMI in 2004[46, 47], with Japan 
Tobacco International (JTI) in 2007[48] and with Imperial Tobacco and BAT in 2010[45, 49, 
50]. Sources suggest that, following the settlements, TTC involvement in large-scale 
smuggling fell from 2000, although new forms of illicit trade emerged[45, 51, 52]. These 
sources looked at discrepancies between cigarette imports and exports, using government 
figures (USA, UK, Spain, Italy)[45, 51, 52] which are not always accurate or reliable[52]. 
The Legacy document archive primarily covers documents up to 2000, and we could not find 
internal industry documents to determine whether TTCs have continued to smuggle cigarettes 
after 2000. Yet, a lawsuit won by Gallaher (in 2007 Japan Tobacco International acquired the 
Gallaher Group) against a Cyprus based distributor in 2008, revealed that Gallaher was 
complicit in smuggling its own cigarettes between 2000 and 2004 through Bulgaria[53]. A 
report by the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project claims that JTI internal 
investigators found JTI to be complicit in smuggling its own cigarettes to and through EU 
member states in 2009 and 2010, via routes including ‘the Balkans’, but it is unclear whether 
this included Bulgaria[54]. JTI investigators behind these allegations have since been sacked 
by JTI management[54]. 
 
In addition to TTC involvement, tobacco industry journals (likely to favour a TTC viewpoint) 
suggest that Bulgartabac may have also been involved in smuggling its own cigarettes for 
sale both within and outside Bulgaria[55]. One interviewee suggested that politicians may 
also be involved in facilitating illicit trade (Interviewee 4, NGO representative). Research by 
the Centre for the Study of Democracy (Bulgaria)[35] indicates that in 2003, when 
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Bulgartabac was the only national cigarette manufacturer, cigarettes manufactured in 
Bulgaria were fictitiously exported from and re-imported to the country, thus avoiding excise 
duties and VAT[35]. A United Nations report on the illicit trade of tobacco and other drugs 
also states that in 2007, cigarettes produced in Bulgaria and Luxemburg were illicitly 
imported to Libya[56].  
 
Change of TCC approach to the illicit trade after EU accession 
Bulgaria’s accession to the EU required the abolition of administrative price-setting (removed 
in July 2006)[57], the lifting of import duties (in January 2007)[57], and the implementation 
of EU tobacco tax directives (see next section). These changes led to an increase in the 
official market share held by the TTCs (Figure 1).  
Figure 1 TTC market share of cigarette sales in Bulgaria 2001- 2009 (%) 
 
Source: Adapted from Euromonitor (2010) Cigarettes - Bulgaria[62]. Represents legal sales only. 
 
While illicit trade featured heavily in the TTCs’ documents but not in their public discourse 
prior to accession, after accession TTCs now regularly publicise their own research on 
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smuggling and use smuggling as an argument against increasing tobacco excise tax rates[45, 
58, 59]. For example, in 2007 a representative of the National Union of Tobacco Producers 
warned that the planned excise tax increases would raise smuggling by around 20% resulting 
in large financial losses for the treasury, without indicating how this estimate was 
produced[58]. In 2009, the general managers of leading TTCs advised Bulgarian government 
officials that long-term stability of cigarette excise tax rates was necessary to curb the rise in 
smuggling[60], and in January 2010, a Bulgartabac spokesman warned that as a result of 
excise tax increases, illicit trade would be expected to make up 40% of Bulgarian cigarette 
sales that year[61]. This estimate was based on a survey of unknown methodology conducted 
by Bulgartabac[61]. In 2011, PMI released research which estimated that illicit trade had 
reached 34% of total sales in 2010[59], similar to the 30.7% figure for 2010 recorded in a 
KPMG report on cigarette smuggling commissioned by PMI as part of its 2004 agreement 
with the European Union[45]. KPMG report estimates are based on a variety of data but with 
heavy reliance on data and expertise from industry, while illicit trade estimates are based on 
cigarette seizures which exclude smuggled cigarettes which pass unnoticed[45]. 
 
A comparison of the figures the industry uses on the illicit trade with a variety of independent 
sources, suggests that the industry significantly overstates the extent of the impact that tax 
increases will have on the illicit trade. Euromonitor data (apparently based on official 
statistics, industry data, and Euromonitor’s own estimates)  indicated that the proportion of 
illegal sales increased from 6% to 27% between 2004 and 2009[62], falling to 24% in 
2010[63] (see Table 2). Eurobarometer estimates, based on survey data from face-to-face 
interviews with 1000 individuals from a stratified random sample, are lower, suggesting that 
21% of Bulgarians thought they had bought smuggled cigarettes over a 6 month period in 
2008[64]. According to other independent survey data, also based on a stratified random 
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sample and face-to-face interviews with 1027 respondents, in 2010, 14.5% of Bulgarians 
reported that their latest cigarette pack was smuggled[65]. The fact that independent 
interview-based estimates of illicit trade are considerably lower than industry estimates could 
be explained by differences in methodologies, by interviewees underreporting smuggling, by 
the industry over-reporting smuggling, or a combination of the above.  
 
Table 2 Trend in illicit cigarette sales in Bulgaria (million sticks) 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Legal sales 21,455.2 21,208.1 20,814.4 20,065.7 18,773.7 16,457.2 16,691.7 
Illicit trade 1,278.3 1,696.6 2,497.7 2,976.3 3,922.2 5,979.1 5,276.9 
% penetration of 
illicit trade  
5.7 7.4 10.7 12.9 17.3
1
 26.6
1
 24.0
1
 
Actual consumption 22,742.5 22,904.7 23,312.2 23,042.0 22,695.9 22,436.3 21,968.6 
Source: adapted from Euromonitor (2010) Cigarettes – Bulgaria, and Euromonitor (2011) Tobacco in Bulgaria 
Note 1: 2012 the Euromonitor website released revised illicit trade estimates for years 2008 (at 13.8%), 2009 (at 
17.5%) and 2010 (at 39.7%) [Euromonitor International, "Illicit Trade Volumes". Global Market Information 
Database, Chicago, IL. 2012]. The revised estimates have not yet been published in a Euromonitor report. 
 
Yet, TTC arguments appear to have influenced Bulgarian press and politicians, despite well-
established evidence that large scale smuggling is linked to TTC involvement rather than 
cigarette prices[66, 67]. A brief search of Bulgarian press reports indicates that TTC 
arguments regarding smuggling are rarely questioned and the press relies heavily on citing 
industry figures on smuggling[59, 61, 68-71]. One of our interviewees pointed out that in 
2010, PMI research on cigarette smuggling was widely publicised:  
“...they waved it around in the Parliament and in the media to the left and to the 
right...It caused a scandal in the Parliament: some people accept it, others do not” 
(Interviewee 2, senior public health professional).  
In December that year, Bulgaria’s former Minister of Interior openly criticised the 
government over increases in cigarette excise tax, arguing that they had caused a rise in 
smuggling[72]. The following January (2011), the chief of the Customs Agency urged 
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Parliament to allow Bulgartabac to release new cheap cigarette brands “for the poor” in view 
of unaffordable prices and reportedly high levels of smuggling[73]. An NGO employee 
interviewed for this research seemed convinced that price increases lead to a rise in 
smuggling. A physician and associate professor specialised in public health, spoke of the 
presumed link between price hikes and smuggling: 
“Currently, the political debate between the governing party and the opposition party 
is about the sharp increase in excise which has led to greater cigarette smuggling. It 
is reported that smuggling has increased by more than one third.” (Interviewee 2, 
senior public health professional) 
The latter interviewee remained uncritical of potential TTC interests in portraying a high 
level of smuggling: “Philip Morris have an interest in entering the official sector because 
they are a company after all, which is interested in this, and not [interested] in the 
contraband”(Interviewee 2, senior public health professional). This view persists despite well 
documented evidence of TTC complicity in cigarette smuggling[35, 39, 40, 44, 74, 75].  
 
Industry lobbying to change excise tax structures and levels 
TTCs have actively lobbied the Bulgarian government, since 1989, to change import 
duties[43, 76-78], excise tax structures[28, 71, 76, 77, 79], and subsequently excise tax 
levels[79]. A PMI business plan for 1990-1992 suggests that “Influenc[ing] the taxation 
regime to achieve favourable conditions for excise tax and import duties”[78] was seen as a 
key strategy for improving company profitability in Eastern European markets such as 
Bulgaria. Similarly, BAT, as early as 1994, identified price setting and the existing excise tax 
system as “decisive investment ‘obstacles’ ” which they hoped to influence[80].  
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TTC excise tax structure preferences 
BAT and PMI hoped to change Bulgaria’s fully ad valorem excise tax structure to one more 
favourable to their products[28, 71, 76, 77, 79]. BAT favoured a mixed system with a high 
specific component[76] which would presumably help benefit its broad brand portfolio over 
both PMI’s more concentrated focus on premium brands and Bulgartabac’s cheap, local 
brands[7]. During a meeting between BAT, Bulgartabac board-members and Bulgarian 
government officials in 1991[76], BAT presented a general overview of taxation systems to 
Bulgartabac representatives explaining that the same total cigarette excise tax yield obtained 
in 1991 from a wholly ad valorem excise tax structure could be derived from a mixed 
structure, thus maintaining government revenue[76].  
 
PMI, by contrast, pushed for a fully specific excise tax structure in the 1990s in most Eastern 
European markets[28] including Bulgaria[30]. A specific system would narrow the price 
differential between PMI premium imported brands, particularly Marlboro, and cheaper local 
brands as well as other imported brands from competing TTCs[7]. In 1994, the fully ad 
valorem system was switched to a fully specific taxation system for 2 years (Table 3). 
However, this was a limited success for PMI as the system was tiered with imported 
cigarettes taxed more[81]. Fifteen years later, in 2009, PMI appeared to pursue similar excise 
tax changes with PMI Director of Corporate Affairs for Bulgaria and Romania, Peter Imre, 
urging the Bulgarian Deputy Finance Minister to implement a minimum excise duty to 
guarantee tax revenues for the government and reduce the price differentials between cheap 
and expensive cigarettes[71]. It is difficult to establish to what extent TTC lobbying affected 
excise tax structures but the changes introduced in 2010 benefitted premium brands (Table 3). 
 14 
Table 3 Overview of changes to tobacco excise tax structures in Bulgaria 1988-2011 
Year  Ad valorem 
 (% of TIRSP
1
) 
Specific  
(BGL/BGN
2
 per 1000) 
VAT 
(%TIRSP
1
) 
Import Duty 
(% of Customs value) 
Import tariff 
surcharge
3 
1988 70-80% 0 n/a
1 
n/a 0 
1989 Excise tax reduced 
 (levels  unknown) 
0 n/a n/a 0 
1990 Filter cig (boxed) 22% 
Filter cig (soft pack) 19% 
Plain Cig 15% 
0 n/a n/a 0 
1991 60% 0 n/a n/a 15% 
1992 60% 0 n/a 80%
 
15% 
1993 60% 0 0 40% 3% 
1994 0 Luxury cig: BGL 1000  
Brand cig: BGL 600 
Ordinary cig: BGL 300 
Cigs. w/out filter: BGL 100  
Cigars & cigarillos: BGL 400  
18% 40% 2% 
1995 0 Luxury cig: BGL 1600 
Brand cig: BGL 900 
Ordinary cig: BGL 450 
Cigs. w/out filter: BGL 100  
18% 40% 1% 
1996 60% (from 1/July) Priced up to BGL 60 at BGL 
3000 
Priced over BGL 60 at BGN 
10000  
(until 30/June) 
18% 40%(min 10 USD/1000) Tax lifted 
1997 60% 0 n/a 40%(min 7.7 ECU
2
/1000)  
1998 (New mixed sys) 30% BGN 2 22% 40%  
1999 30% BGN 2  20% 68%  
2000 Filter: 30% 
Non-filter: 10% 
BGN 2  20% 50%  
2001  Filter: 30% 
Non-filter: 10% 
Filter: BGN 2 
Non-filter: BGN 1  
20% 50%(min 9.6 EUR/1000)  
2002 Filter: 40% 
Non-filter: 15% 
Filter: BGN 2 
Non-filter: BGN 1 
20% 50%(min 9.6 EUR/1000)  
2003 Filter: 40% 
Non-filter: 15% 
Filter: BGN 2 
Non-filter: BGN 1 
20% 200%(min 36 EUR/1000)  
2004 Filter: 43.5% 
Non-filter:20% 
Filter: BGN 4 
Non-filter: BGN 2 
20% 200%(min 36 EUR/1000)  
2005 Filter: 43.5% from Feb 
(31.8% in Jan) 
Non-filter: 20% 
Filter: BGN 4 
Non-filter: BGN 2 
20% 200%(min 36 EUR/1000)  
2006 All types: 48% All types: BGN 15 20% 200%(min 36 EUR/1000)  
2007 54% BGN 6.5 n/a 27.95%
4
  
2008 35% BGN 37 n/a 27.95%
4
  
2009 40.5% BGN 41 n/a 27.95%
4
  
2010 23% BGN 101 16.67% 27.95%
4
  
2011 23% BGN 101 16.67% 27.95%
4
  
2012 23% BGN 101 16.67% 27.95%
4
  
Source: The Bulgarian National Customs Agency provided data on import duties, and ad valorem and specific excise tax for 1993-
1997, 2001-2006. Further figures obtained from EU Commission excise tables, industry documents, news reports. N/A = not 
available. Note 1: TIRSP  (Tax Inclusive Retail Sales Price) is a term introduced by the EU, but ad valorem taxation in Bulgaria 
was calculated on tax inclusive retail sales price from at least since 1988. Note 2: Old Bulgarian Lev (BGL) replaced with New 
Bulgarian Lev (BGN) on 1st July 1997. BGL 1000 = BGN 1, BGN 1 = EUR 0.51(www. xe.com 06/Jul/12). ECU (European 
Currency Unit) ECU 1 = BGN 1.93 rate on 1st December 1997. Note 3: Import tariff surcharge introduced for 1991-1995[32, 34], 
calculated on amount due for import duty. Note 4: Intra-EU duties lifted in 2007, import rates from 2007 onwards therefore apply 
only to non-EU imports. 
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The frequent excise changes appear to have influenced cigarette prices and consumption, 
although we only have access to complete data for 2004-2011(Figure 2), and due to 
occasional large scale releases of cigarettes for consumption prior to tax increases, 
consumption figures for some years may be artificially high[82]. A notable rise in price in 
2006 reflects the rise in both ad valorem and specific duties that year, and a similar spike 
occurred in 2010 when specific excise more than doubled. Legal sales fell on both occasions.  
 
Figure 2 Cigarette consumption and Cigarette prices in Bulgaria 2002 – 2012  
 
Source: EU Commission Excise Duty Tables  (for 2002 – 2012). *WAP applies for year 2011-2012 only 
 
External pressures on excise tax policy as opportunities for TTCs 
During integration into the European and international markets, Bulgaria faced pressures to 
facilitate trade. Accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) prohibited preferential 
treatment of local manufacture, e.g. via discriminatory taxes[83]. Similarly, EU accession 
required Bulgaria to abolish import duties for imports within the EU and administrative price 
setting[57], and implement EU tobacco tax directives. The latter required a mixed excise tax 
system and an overall minimum excise duty (specific duty plus ad valorem duty excluding 
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VAT) of 57% of the retail selling price (inclusive of all taxes) for cigarettes of the most 
popular price category (MPPC)[84, 85]. Further amendments to the directive (99/81/EC and 
2002/10/EC) added that the minimum total excise tax would be 60 Euros/1000 cigarettes (64 
Euros/1000 from 1 July 2006)[86].  
 
TTCs hoped to capitalise on such pressures from accession to the WTO in 1996,[87] and EU 
accession in 2007, in order to avoid “discriminative taxes” against imported products[76, 77]. 
On April 10
th
 1996, during one of several meetings held between Mr Schlunk, “a qualified 
BAT-Germany expert in the field of duties and excise taxes”[77] and Mr Mladenov, 
chairman of the supervisory board of Bulgartabac and member of the Bulgarian Ministry of 
Trade[77], Schlunk noted that, in line with WTO principles, “differentiation between 
domestic and international brands is not acceptable”. Schlunk advised that, “as an option 
acceptable for WTO” a three-tier taxation structure could be adopted where imported 
cigarettes and expensive Bulgartabac brands could both be taxed at the same level[77]. Two 
weeks later, the Ministry of Trade announced it was “working on a new method for 
calculation of tobacco products excise tax” which would be “based on a firm price and a 
percentage of the price of cigarettes”[77](i.e. a mixed system). The Minister indicated that the 
change was being introduced to avoid discriminating against imported cigarettes[77]. This, 
and BAT’s note about the announcement, suggests that the change in policy may have been 
influenced by BAT: 
“The statement of Mr Paparizov [Minister of Trade] was done only a few days after 
the meeting of Mr Schlunk from BAT Germany and Mr Rossen Natchev from B.A.T 
Bulgaria with experts from the Trade Ministry. This statement is fully in compliance 
with the advises given during the above meeting and can be considered as a direct 
result of it”[77].  
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We were unable to confirm this fully through excise tax data (Table 3) and although 
subsequent excise tax changes tended to benefit BAT, they were not exactly what BAT had 
requested. A two tier system that would have benefitted BAT over Bulgartabac and could 
have been the result of its lobbying was introduced at some time in 1996 to replace the four-
tiered system, but it is unclear whether this followed the April 1996 meeting. The government 
then reverted back to a fully ad valorem system in 1996-97, and a mixed excise tax system 
was only introduced in 1998 (Table 3).  
 
The Bulgarian government’s desire to adhere to EU and WTO demands, to protect 
Bulgartabac profits, and simultaneously deal with industry lobbying on tobacco excise tax, 
led to frequent changes in policy (Table 3). For example, price-setting was removed briefly in 
January 2005[17, 88] but, when Bulgartabac brands suffered, Bulgartabac petitioned the 
Ministry of Finance and the mechanism was restored three months later[17] only finally 
being abolished in 2007[88] as a requirement for accession. Similarly on import duties, 
following a 1999 memorandum between the Bulgarian government and the EU, import duties 
on filter cigarettes imported from EU countries were to be capped at 52% applicable from 
2001[43, 89]. In order to compensate for the fact that imported cigarettes would become 
cheaper and reduce the price gap between local and imported brands[90], the government 
temporarily raised import duties from 40% in 1998 to 68% in 1999 to protect 
Bulgartabac[90], and subsequently reduced them to 50% in 2000(Table 3). This prompted 
TTC lobbying to reduce the duty downwards[43]. The government then introduced a “hidden 
increase in import duty”[43] in the form of a 5% of Duty Paid Landed Cost[43] which BAT 
set out to revoke[43], and in the three years prior to accession raised import duties to an all-
time high of 200% (Table 3). Intra-EU import duties were lifted with Bulgaria’s accession in 
2007.  
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The process of industry influence 
To influence Bulgarian policy, industry documents reveal that BAT had repeated, direct 
contact with Bulgartabac representatives[23, 24, 31, 32, 76, 77, 80, 90, 91] and other 
government officials[90, 92]. In 1998 BAT claimed to have “immediately established 
contacts with the Ministries of Trade and Finance as well as with the National Assembly and 
are arranging meetings at highest levels”[90]. A tobacco control expert formerly working for 
the Bulgarian Ministry of Health explained how TTCs tried to influence Bulgarian 
government decisions on EU accession changes, describing the contacts of PMI and BAT 
with the Ministry of Health as “very aggressive...in all respects, very aggressive with 
proposals”(Interviewee 1, former Ministry of Health employee). The interviewee recounts 
that: 
“Before we received the official minutes [of Ministry committee discussing EU 
accession decisions], even before we even had any of the documents, they [TTCs] 
were already telling us what their opinion was and what should happen, and that 
when we’re voting we should take this, that and the other into account, when we’re at 
various meetings... They often asked me, ‘Who’s going to be at that meeting?’ so they 
could contact them directly.” (Interviewee 1, former Ministry of Health employee) 
 
TTCs have continued to lobby Bulgarian ministers and high-level politicians directly in 
recent years. In 2009, PMI representatives discussed Bulgaria’s excise tax system with the 
Deputy Finance Minister[71]. Representatives from major TTCs and Bulgartabac met with 
Bulgarian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Interior in 2010[60] and with the Prime 
Minister, the Finance Minister, the head of the Customs Agency, and the head of the Criminal 
Police Directorate in 2011[93] to discuss the government’s crack-down on illicit trade.  
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DISCUSSION 
Smuggling 
Prior to EU accession TTCs actively participated in the illegal import of their cigarettes into 
Bulgaria, and through Bulgaria to other closed markets. This finding supports existing 
evidence of the TTCs’ widespread use of smuggling as a market access strategy[7, 11, 13, 94, 
95 ]. Also, the duty-free business was used as a disguise for illicit trade in Bulgaria[32], as 
has been done elsewhere[39, 96-99], highlighting the need for duty-free sales to be ended. 
There is evidence that TTC involvement in cigarette smuggling continued post-2000 and up 
until 2010, despite the 2000 legal case[44]and subsequent settlements[45-50]. Corruption and 
possible political involvement in smuggling are underlying concerns and Bulgartabac may 
also be involved[35, 55, 56]. This is consistent with evidence from Montenegro of high-level 
political involvement in cigarette smuggling[100, 101] and of the complex links between 
cigarette smuggling, corruption and organised crime[102-105].  
 
Finally, while previously silent on smuggling, after EU accession TTCs now propound the 
idea that stability of cigarette excise tax rates is key to preventing smuggling to Bulgaria[60, 
71, 93], having also used this argument elsewhere[66, 67, 106]. Such claims contrast with  
historical and well established research on EU countries which suggests that large-scale 
cigarette smuggling is unrelated to price, generally being higher where cigarettes are 
cheaper[66, 67, 106] and with more recent research based on interviews with smokers which 
indicates that levels of illicit tobacco use in Europe are unrelated to price[107]. Nevertheless, 
our interview data suggest that the price argument is widely believed in the Bulgarian public 
health community. Comparisons between industry data and independent data on smuggling 
also suggest that, as in Poland[108], the industry may exaggerate the extent of the illicit trade. 
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There is a need to use independent data on the extent of the problem, rather than relying on 
industry commissioned research[45](See Box 3).  
 
Tobacco Excise Tax Policy and Bulgarian EU accession 
This paper shows that influencing the excise tax regime, import duties and pricing 
mechanism was a central part of BAT’s and PMI’s business strategy for Bulgaria[43, 77, 78]. 
Also, demands from WTO and EU accession, provided TTCs with opportunities to influence 
policy in their favour, as discussed elsewhere[86]. Ultimately, Bulgarian excise tax policy 
reflected a complex balance between government efforts to protect Bulgartabac, TTC 
influence, and the need to meet EU and WTO requirements, which resulted in frequent and 
abrupt changes in excise tax structures and levels. Comparing cigarette prices and 
consumption from 2004 onwards suggests that large increases in excise were largely reflected 
in price increases and decreases in legal cigarette sales. 
 
As in other countries[2, 7, 15, 109], BAT and PMI lobbied for different excise tax structures 
in Bulgaria[76]. BAT pushed for a mixed excise tax system and claimed it had influenced 
excise tax changes in May 1996[77]. Yet, in 1994 and 1995 a fully specific (tiered) system 
was introduced, which PMI lobbied for in the 90’s[28, 30] . A sudden switch to a specific 
system was also observed in Poland in 1993[110] following successful PMI lobbying, and in 
the Czech Republic in 1991 possibly as result of PMI lobbying[7]. PMI may have influenced 
this policy change in Bulgaria although we were unable to obtain direct evidence to this 
effect. In 2009 PMI lobbied for minimum excise tax in Bulgaria[71] while in other European 
countries (Austria, France, Italy, Belgium), PMI is thought to have successfully lobbied for 
minimum prices (rather than duties), which were subsequently deemed illegal by the 
European Court of Justice under existing EU Treaties[8].  
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TTCs enjoyed limited influence on Bulgarian tobacco excise tax policy prior to and during 
Bulgaria’s EU accession but were less successful in influencing import duties, administrative 
price setting and the excise tax system which they lobbied on since 1989[78]. Overall they 
appear less influential than in other former communist countries including the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Poland which also joined the EU[2, 7, 14, 15]. Reasons for this may 
include that, a) unlike other countries explored[7, 9, 12, 13, 110, 111], the state-owned 
tobacco company had not yet been privatised and the government remained committed to 
protect Bulgartabac profits, b) the ethnic minority party MRF, a partner in coalition 
governments since 1992[112], was opposed to privatisation[113, 114] and may have opposed 
policies it deemed favourable to the TTCs, c) documentary and interview data has been more 
limited for Bulgaria than for other case studies conducted[7, 110, 115] and TTCs may have 
enjoyed greater influence than we have been able to detect.  
 
Method of influence and FCTC Article 5.3 
The Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) called for the implementation of 
Article 5.3, established to protect public health “from commercial and other vested interests 
of the tobacco industry”[116], which Bulgaria ratified in 2005. Yet, TTCs continue to enjoy 
access to ministers and high level politicians, which contravenes Article 5.3, with examples 
of this in 2009[71], in 2010[60], and 2011[93]. While some contact between government and 
industry may be warranted, implementation guidelines for Article 5.3 stress that government 
should limit interactions and ensure their transparency[117]. However, press coverage, 
industry documents and informant interviews suggest that current interactions do not fit these 
criteria and that TTCs use meetings with government officials and politicians to influence tax 
policy to benefit their brands. This underlines the important role for civil society groups in 
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exposing the nature of such meetings and holding their governments accountable for the 
implementation of this Article[116](Box 3) .  
Box 3 Policy recommendations  
      Smuggling 
 Implement continuous independent monitoring of potential industry involvement in illicit 
trade.  
 Consider further legal action against the TTCs and Bulgartabac on smuggling issue. 
 Commission independent data on extent and nature of illicit trade is required.  
 Educate public health experts, politicians and civil servants about TTCs involvement in 
cigarette smuggling and about the true nature of the illicit tobacco trade. 
 Public health groups need to engage with media to ensure accurate coverage of 
smuggling issue and to ensure that industry versions of events are counterbalanced with 
more accurate information. 
 
      Policy influence 
 Provide independent advice to politicians, civil servants and public health groups on 
effective tobacco excise tax policy and on industry efforts to mislead and undermine 
policy 
 Provide future EU accession states with independent advice on tobacco excise tax policy. 
 Improve implementation of FCTC Article 5.3 and monitor and expose industry (including 
TTC and Bulgartabac) actions. 
 
 
What this paper adds 
To date, there is no published research looking at transnational tobacco company (TTC) 
strategies used to penetrate the Bulgarian market. Bulgaria is unique as it maintained a state-
owned tobacco company until October 2011. Government excise tax policy had to balance 
government interests in the monopoly, TTC pressures to penetrate the market, and pressures 
resulting from Bulgaria’s EU accession. 
 
This paper shows how TTCs relied on cigarette smuggling as a market entry strategy in 
Bulgaria, and points to continued TTC complicity in the illicit trade between 2000 and 2010. 
After gaining market share, TTCs now publicise commissioned research, which exaggerates 
the scale of illicit trade, to erroneously convince Bulgarian politicians and public health 
experts that tax increases lead to increased cigarette smuggling.  
 
TTCs tried to influence Bulgarian tobacco excise tax policy to favour their brands, but appear 
to have been relatively less successful than in other former communist countries due to the 
continued presence of the state-owned tobacco company. TTCs have continued to lobby via 
direct contact with ministers and officials despite Bulgaria’s ratification of the FCTC in 2005. 
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